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IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW. 
POINT I 
A. Did the State of Utah present sufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant received or 
retained stolen property? 
B. Did the State of Utah present sufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knew or had reason 
to believe that the items were stolen? 
C. Did the State of Utah present sufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the requisite 
intent to purposely deprive the owners of the property? 
POINT II 
Was Appellant deprived of his right to a fair and impartial 
jury trial in that he was of Mexican descent and that no members 
of the jury panel were of Mexican descent? 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES. 
The following are constitutional provisions and statutes 
whose interpretation is determinative in this case: 
Constitution of the United States of America, Sixth Amendment: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trialf by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
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Constitution of Utahf Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all caes. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, 
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-408 (1953 as amended): 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, 
or disposes of the property of another knowing that it 
has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids 
in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen with 
a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, 
or title or lending on th esecurity of the property; 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
The Appellant, Robert Gabaldon appeals from a conviction of 
receiving stolen property in the First Judicial District Court, 
Cache County, State of Utah. 
B. Disposition In The Trial Court. 
The Appellant, Robert Gabaldon, was found guilty by a jury 
sitting before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen of the crime of 
-4-
theft by retaining or receiving stolen property on June 12, 1986, 
and was thereafter sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a terra 
as prescribed by law. 
C. Relief Sought On Appeal. 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction. Counsel on 
appeal requests permission to withdraw from the appeal and submits 
this brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 
87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed 2d 493 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On April 29, 1986, at approximately 12:00 a.m. Patricia Ann 
Martinez, Appellant and Mathew E. Nevarez left Ogden, Utah, and 
travelled in Robert Gabaldon's car to Logan, Utah. (Trial Record 
of Transcript page 113. Hereinafter the Trial Record of 
Transcript shall be designated as "T.R.") They travelled to Logan 
at the request of Patricia Ann Martinez so that she could shop at 
various stores in Logan, Utah. (T.R. 244.) 
The three individuals arrived at the Cache Valley Mall and 
Patricia Ann Martinez along with her four year old daughter went 
into a store called The Bon. (T.R. 119 and 120.) Appellant and 
Mathew E. Nevarez did not go into The Bon but went to other parts 
of the Mall. (T.R. 121.) While in The Bon Patricia Ann Martinez 
took Bon sacks, jeans and shirts. (T.R. 101 and 102.) After she 
had returned to the car she was able to put the stolen items into 
The Bon sacks, without Appellantfs or Mathew E. Nevarez1 knowledge 
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because they had not returned to the car yet. (T.R. 123.) When 
Appellant and Mathew E. Nevarez returned to the car Patricia Ann 
Martinez asked Appellant to place The Bon sacks with merchandise 
in the trunk of the car. (T.R. 124 and 248.) Patricia Ann 
Martinez did not inform Appellant that the items were stolen. 
(T.R. 237.) 
After Appellant and Mathew Nevarez returned to the car, 
Patricia Ann Martinez asked Mathew E. Nevarez to take a pair of 
pants into The Bon for a refund. (T.R. 150 and 151.) Mathew E. 
Nevarez received a refund from The Bon of approximately $31.00 
which he gave to Patricia Ann Martinez. (T.R. 151.) 
Next, Patricia Ann Martinez requested Appellant to take her 
to J. C. Penney1sf on the west side of the Cache Valley Mall, 
which he did. (T.R. 125.) Patricia Ann Martinez along with her 
daughter went into the J. C. Penneyfs store and stole a number of 
shirts, jackets and socks by placing them in a large J. C. Penney 
bag. (T.R. 127.) Appellant and Mathew Nevarez remained in the 
car while Patricia Ann Martinez went into J. C. Penney's. (T.R. 
249.) When Patricia Ann Martinez came out from J. C. Penney's 
with the stolen items Appellant and Mathew Nevarez were outside 
the car playing a game called hackey sack in the parking lot. 
(T.R. 250.) Patricia Ann Martinez did not inform Appellant that 
the J. C. Penney items were stolen. (T.R. 250.) 
At the request of Patricia Ann Martinez the individuals then 
drove to the Burger King Restaurant so that her little girl could 
use the restroom. (T.R. 129.) Patricia Ann Martinez and her 
-6-
little girl went into the restrooms first and when they returned 
Appellant and Mathew Nevarez had gone into the restrooms. (T.R. 
130.) At this time, Patricia Ann Martinez took the items from the 
large J. C. Penney's bag and placed them in The Bon bags in the 
trunk of the car without Appellant knowing about it. (T.R. 130.) 
When Appellant and Mathew Nevarez returned to the car the 
individuals drove again to the Z.C.M.I. store at the Cache Valley 
Mall. (T.R. 131.) Patricia Ann Martinez and her daughter went 
into the Z.C.M.I. store leaving Appellant and Mathew Nevarez in 
the car in the parking lot. (T.R. 131 and 132.) While in Z.C.M.I. 
Patricia Ann Martinez placed children's underwear and jeans in the 
large J. C. Penney's bag and returned back to the car. (T.R. 
134 and 137.) Appellant and Mathew Nevarez were at the car when 
Patricia Ann Martinez returned and Patricia Ann Martinez tried to 
conceal the large bag from Appellant by placing it in the back 
seat of the car. (T.R. 138.) Patricia Ann Martinez did not 
inform Appellant that the items in the bag were stolen. (T.R. 
255.) 
Patricia Ann Martinez asked Appellant to take her to the Fred 
Meyers store. (T.R. 139.) After the parties had arrived at Fred 
Meyers, Patricia Ann Martinez and her daughter went into the store 
and Patricia Ann Martinez stole boxes of men's and women's cologne 
and a bicycle computer. (T.R. 141 and 142.) Patricia Ann Martinez 
placed the stolen items in her purse. (T.R. 143.) Patricia Ann 
Martinez returned to the car where Appellant and Mathew Nevarez 
were waiting. (T.R. 142.) Patricia Ann Martinez did not tell 
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Appellant that she had stolen the items which were in her purse. 
(T.R. 257.) 
Particia Ann Martinez then asked Appellant to drive her to 
the K-Mart store, which Appellant did. (T.R. 143.) Patricia Ann 
Martinez and her daughter went into K-Mart leaving Appellant and 
Mathew Nevarez in the car. (T.R. 215.) While in K-Mart Patricia 
Ann Martinez placed tape cassettes, cassette cases and a padlock 
in her purse. (T.R. 145.) When she returned to the car, 
Appellant and Mathew Nevarez were waiting at the car. (T.R. 145 
and 146.) Patricia Ann Martinez did not tell Appellant that she 
had stolen the items from K-Mart. (T.R. 259.) 
Patricia Ann Martinez then requested Appellant to drive her 
the The Bon store so that she could return some merchandise. 
(T.R. 148.) Appellant drove back to The Bon and Patricia Ann 
Martinez took two of the stolen shirts into the store and received 
a refund of $21.00. (T.R. 149 and 153.) Patricia Ann Martinez 
did not inform Appellant that the returned items were stolen. 
(T.R. 262.) Also she did not give any of the refund money to 
Appellant. (T.R. 263.) 
After Patricia Ann Martinez had received the refund she 
requested that Appellant take her to the Sunset Sporting Goods 
store, which he did. (T.R. 153.) Patricia Ann Martinez then went 
by herself into the Sunset store where she placed shirts and a 
jacket in her blue jacket. (T.R. 153.) Patricia Ann Martinez 
removed the items from the Sunset store without paying for them. 
(T.R. 232.) Upon returning to the car Patricial Ann Martinez asked 
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Mathew Nevarez if he would return some of the items to Sunset to 
get a refund. (T.R. 154.) Mathew Nevarez returned the items and 
obtained a refund for $42.00, which he gave to Patricia Ann 
Martinez. (T.R. 156.) Mathew Nevarez used the name of John 
Martinez to obtain the refund. (T.R. 156.) Appellant remained in 
the car and did not participate in the refund. (T.R. 155 and 
263.) At no time did Patricia Ann Martinez inform Appellant that 
the items from Sunset were stolen. (T.R. 262.) 
After Patricia Ann Martinez received the refund from Sunset 
Sporting Goods she requested Appellant to take her to get 
something to eat. The individuals went to Hardees restaurant to 
eat. (T.R. 157.) After they had eaten the individuals began 
driving back to Ogden. On their way back to Ogden, Utah, the Utah 
Highway Patrol stopped Appellant and requested he return back to 
Logan. Appellant agreed to return and followed the Utah Highway 
Patrolman and while driving back Appellant kept wondering why the 
officer had stopped him. (T.R. 159 and 265.) When they had 
almost returned to the Cache County Sheriff's Office Patricia Ann 
Martinez informed Appellant that she had stolen the merchandise. 
(T.R. 265.) This was the first time Patricia Ann Martinez had 
informed Appellant she had stolen the items. (T.R. 266.) 
Patricia Ann Martinez had never given Appellant any of the items 
or refunds. (T.R. 267.) 
Patricia Ann Martinez plead guilty to the charge of second 
degree felony theft by retaining on May 12i 1986, which was prior 
to Appellants trial. 
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VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
1. Plaintiff's conviction of receiving or retaining stolen 
property in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-408 
(1953 as amended) should be reversed for the following reasons: 
(a) That the State failed to present sufficient evidence that 
Appellant "received" or "retained" property which had been stolen; 
(b) that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that 
Appellant "knew" the property had been stolen or "believed" that 
the property had probably been stolen; and (c) that the State 
failed to present sufficient evidence that Appellant acted pur-
posely to deprive the owner of the possession of the property. 
2. Appellant's conviction of receiving or retaining stolen 
property pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-408 (1953 
as amended) because Appellant was not allowed a fair trial by jury 
in that no members of the Mexican-American minority were present 
on the jury panel. 
IX. ARGUMENT. 
POINT I 
A. THE STATE OF UTAH FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
APPELLANT RECEIVED OR RETAINED STOLEN PROPERTY 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-6-408. 
Appellant was charged and tried under Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-6-408(1) (1953 as amended) which states: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has 
been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding any such property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in reference to the crime of receiving sto-
len property has outlined the basic elements in the case of State 
v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399-401 (Utah, 1980) which are as follows: 
(1) Property belonging to another has been stolen; 
(2) That Appellant received, retained or disposed of 
the stolen property; 
(3) At the time of receiving, retaining or disposing 
of the property the Appellant knew or believed the 
property was stolen; and, 
(4) The Appellant acted purposedly to deprive the owner 
of the possession of the property. 
The Court has also stated that for a criminal convicted of 
receiving or retaining stolen property, the prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime. State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah, 1980) and State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 
1061, 1064 (Utah, 1983). 
From the elements as stated above, it is Appellant's con-
tention that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Appellant received or retained stolen property. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 76-6-408 (3) (a) (1953 as amended) defines 
"receives" as meaning "acquiring possessiqn, control, or title or 
lending on the security of the property." It is quite clear from 
the trial transcript that the State relied heavily upon the testi-
mony of Patricia Ann Martinez to attempt to prove its case. There 
is nothing in her testimony nor in any other testimony of the 
other witnesses which indicates that Appellant "received" or 
"retained" stolen property. 
The transcript clearly indicates that Patricia Ann Martinez 
asked Appellant to bring her to Logan so that she could go to the 
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various stores. While it is true that the Appellant's car was 
used in the transportation from Ogden to Logan and from one store 
to another, Patricia Ann Martinez testified that she was the one 
who went into the store and stole the items and that she never 
told the Appellant about stealing the items until the police had 
requested them to return back to Logan. 
Furthermore, Martinez testified that every chance she had she 
tried to hide the large J, C. Penney1s bag and items that she had 
taken. (T.R. 255.) Also, Martinez testified that she did not 
tell Appellant about the items she took specifically from Fred 
Meyers because she was trying to hide her purse to conceal the 
fact that she had taken the items. (T.R. 257.) After Martinez 
had taken the items from The Bon she testified that she alone 
placed the items into Bon sacks so that it would appear that the 
items had been purchased from The Bon. (T.R. 123.) The only time 
that Appellant was able to see what items were placed in the trunk 
was after Martinez had placed the items in The Bon sacks she 
requested that Appellant put the sacks in the trunk without indi-
cating to Appellant that the items were stolen. (T.R. 124.) 
Appellant only opened the trunk once and all the other times when 
the trunk of the car was opened it was done by Martinez. (T.R. 
288.) 
Martinez also testified that at no time did she give any of 
the items from any of the stores to Appellant. (T.R. 259 and 
267.) Furthermore, Martinez stated that at no time had she ever 
given Appellant any of the refund money that was received from The 
-12-
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We would appreciate it if you would accept this letter 
as a formal response in lieu of filing a brief and either proceed 
to dismiss the appeal on its merits or in harmony with Anders v. 
California, If the Court is desirous of having additional input 
from our office in any particular, we would be happy to comply 
upon direction* 
Very truly yours, 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Bon or Sunset stores. (T.R. 263 and 265.) 
Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence at 
trial to show that Appellant either received or retained stolen 
property. Pursuant to the definition of receives in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 76-6-408 (3) (a) at no time did Appellant acquire 
possession, control or title of the property. Each time any pro-
perty was obtained it was obtained by Patricia Ann Martinez. She 
exercised control and possession over the properties by either 
putting the properties in other sacks, her purse or placing them 
loose in the trunk of the car or under the front seat. The 
control and possession that Martinez exercised over the property 
was not known to Appellant because Martinez concealed from 
Appellant that fact that the itmes were stolen. 
B. THE STATE OF UTAH FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
APPELLANT KNEW OR BELIEVED THE ITEMS OF MERCHANDISE 
HAD BEEN STOLEN PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 76-6-408(1). | 
I 
Appellant's next point of contention is concerning the ele-
ment that at the time of receiving or retaining of the property 
that Appellant knew or believed the property had been stolen. In 
the present case, Appellant was never told that the items from The 
Bon, J. C. Penney's, Z.C.M.I., Fred Meyers, K-Mart and Sunset were 
stolen. (T.R. 247, 250, 255, 257, 259 and 262.) There was no evi-
dence that Appellant participated in any of the thefts from any of 
the stores. The only evidence the state could present at trial 
was that Appellant was driving the car and transporting Patricia 
Ann Martinez to the different stores. His transportation of 
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Patricia Ann Martinez was done without any knowledge or reason to 
believe that any of the items were stolen. As stated above, 
Patricia Ann Martinez made every effort to hide and conceal the 
thefts from Appellant. (T.R. 267.) 
The prosecutor in his closing argument attempted to make an 
issue out of the fact that Patricia Ann Martinez had been to six 
different stores over a Ah hours period of time. The prosecutor 
also argued that because of the time period and the amount of 
stores that there was no way that Appellant did not know or have 
reason to believe that the items were stolen. However, from the 
testimony at trial it is important to note that Patricia Ann 
Martinez stated she never informed Appellant of the items being 
stolen nor did she ever give any of the items or refund monies to 
Appellant. She indicates that she was stealing these items for 
her own benefit to sell the merchandise and receive money to live 
on. (T.R. 127 and 257.) Therefore, the State has failed to show 
with any evidence that Appellant knew or believed that the items 
had been stolen. 
C. THE STATE OF UTAH FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT HAD THE REQUISITE MENTAL 
INTENT TO PURPOSELY DEPRIVE THE OWNER OF THE 
STOLEN MERCHANDISE, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
The final point which Appellant asserts is that the State 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Appellant acted "with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof." As the Court stated in the case of State v. Murphy, 617 
P.2d at 402 (Utah, 1980): 
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"A defendant's intent is rarely susceptible of direct 
proof and therefore the prosecution usually must rely 
on a combination of direct and circum^tancial evidence 
to establish this element." 
The Court goes on to say that criminal convictions cannot be based 
upon conjectures or probabilities but must be supported by a quan-
tum of evidence concerning each element so that the jury may find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In conjunction with the argument stated above concerning 
whether Appellant received or retained the property it is impor-
tant for the Court to note that at no time did Patricia Ann 
Martinez inform the Appellant that she was stealing the items or 
that she had received refunds for stolen items. Furthermore, at 
no time did Patricia Ann Martinez give or provide any of the items 
to Appellant. In fact as stated above, it was her testimony that 
she made every effort to conceal and hide the merchandise and the 
fact it was stolen from Appellant. (T.R. 267.) If Appellant did 
not receive or retain any of the items and if Appellant did not 
know or have a belief that the items were stolen, then how could 
he have acted with the mental intent to purposely deprive the 
owners of the property. Appellant submits to the Court that the 
State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt or with sufficient 
evidence that Appellant had the requisite mental intent to pur-
posely deprive the stores of any merchandise. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
JURY TRIAL PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 12 AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HE WAS OF MEXICAN DESCENT AND NO 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY PANEL WERE OF MEXICAN DESCENT. 
The following argument is submitted to the Court at the 
request and insistence of Appellant and counsel for Appellant 
makes the argument with an understanding and in light of the 
Court's prior ruling in the case of State v. Leggroanf 475 P.2d 
57, 59 (Utah, 1970). 
At trial, counsel for Appellant and counsel for Mathew E. 
Nevarez objected to the jury panel on the basis that the defen-
dants would not get a fair and impartial trial because there were 
no minorities on the panel. (T.R. 14 and 15.) The Judge denied 
the objections stating the jury panel selection process was done 
randomly. Further, the court took "judicial notice" that there 
are few individuals who would fit within the minority classifica-
tion and that to insure that minorities were present on the panel 
would in itself be a contravention of the law. (T.R. 15.) 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 12 
provides that the accused in all criminal prosecutions shall have 
the right to have a speedy public trial by an "impartial jury". 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly 
provides that "...the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state of district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed..." 
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Appellant is of Mexican descent. There was not present - • 
the jury panel any iihiividu.il.. of MexiA1 in descent, Appella in-
tends that pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article I, 
Secti o 1:1 ] 2 ai 1 d 11: 1 e S i xth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution he did not receive a fair and'impartial jury, thus 
violating his constitutional right. 
X. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the above-cited authorities and references from 
the trial record Appellant respectful!; requests the Court reverse 
his conviction because the State ol: . iiled l.u | »i: eseii i -.ul • 
ficient evidence * > prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
J ^ •": • stol en merchandise; or that he had 
knowledge of or believed it to be stolen merchandise; or that 
Appellant had the required mental intent to purposely deprive the 
ownei ;•. of l-lie inereband i o^ , 
Furthermore, Appellant respectfully requests the Court to 
reverse his conviction because his constitutional right to a fair 
and impa r t i a 1 11: i a I wa s d en i ed bee aus e Appe 11 an t i s o f Me x I can 
descent and there were not any individuals on the jury who were of 
Mexican descent. 
Couns« Appe 1 i 4.•.T respectfully requests pei:inissioi I to 
withdraw as counsel f believing the appeal is without meritorious 
groi m d s . forpqo I [iq In ief discuss^ . Mif law applicable to the 
only points that could arguably support the appeal. Counsel for 
Appellant has instructed Appellant that he will be allowed time to 
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raise any points he chooses. This brief is submitted pursuant to 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah, 1981). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this day of November, 1986. 
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS 
By: 
Thomas L. Willmore 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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